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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LA-W - COMMERCE CLAUSE - POWER OF A STATE
To TAX THE PRIVILEGE OF ENGAGING IN INTERSTATE COMI'.ERCE
Petitioner, Spector Motor Service, Inc., is a Missouri corporation
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. It leases and utilizes
terminals in Connecticut and employs twenty-seven workers within
the state; it owns pick-up trucks which are registered and used in
Connecticut, but the corporation has not been authorized by the
State of Connecticut to do intrastate trucking and does not engage
in it. The corporation was assessed for taxes and penalties. The tax
imposed was a franchise tax for the privilege of doing business within
the State of Connecticut. The tax was computed at a non-discrimi-
natory rate on that part of the corporation's net income which was
reasonably attributable to its business activities within the state.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1896-1921 (1949). The petitioner sought to en-
join collection of the tax and asked for a declaratory judgment of
non-liability. The federal district court, applying the state court's
interpretation of the Act to the effect that it was precisely a privilege
tax, held the Act unconstitutional. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that interstate commerce can be made to pay its
way if the tax is reasonable and the revenue is used in paying its
share of the costs of government. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
held, reversed. The privilege of engaging in solely interstate com-
merce cannot be taxed by a state even though the tax is non-discrimi-
natory and taxes only that pa)t of the net income which reasonably
can-be attributed to business activity within the state. Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951).
The starting point in determining whether a state can tax the
privilege of doing interstate commerce is the "Cooley Compromise."
Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851). In effect, the
"compromise" meant that where there was a relatively localized aspect
of the fact situation in a particular case, the power to tax interstate
commerce was concurrent in the state and federal governments. Where
there was a national aspect of the fact situation in a particular case,
the power to tax interstate commerce was exclusive in the federal
government.
One of the patently localized situations is that of a state property
tax levied on property situated in the state but used in interstate
commerce. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co.,
293 U. S. 15 (1934); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284
(1927); Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330 (1923). Where the
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situs is divided among several states, each state may tax its proportion-
ate share of the whole property so long as in the aggregate the tax
base does not appreciably exceed 1007o. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
342 U. S. 382 (1952); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Missouri, 190
U. S. 412 (1903).
Included in the exclusive category of the "compromise" have
been taxes on gross receipts of transportation companies engaged in
interstate commerce. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217
(1908); Philadelphia & So. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S.
326 (1887). One of the outstanding inclusions has been the tax on the
privilege of engaging in solely interstate commerce. Joseph v. Carter
& Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947); Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachussetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925); Ozark Pipe Line
Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925). It is upon this line of authority
that the majority based its decision.
Many of the holdings since about 1938 have shown a trend to-
ward expanding the concurrent category by allowing states to tax
interstate commerce under the "multiple burden" test. Helerstein,
State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 4 TAx L. REv. 95
(1948); Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions,
47 COL. L. REv. 211 (1947); Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts
Taxes, 60 HAuv. L. RYv. 501 (1947). Under the "multiple burden"
test, only such state taxes on interstate business are invalid as are
susceptible of being imposed with equal right by other states, so that
interstate commerce is required to bear a heavier burden of taxation
than is intra-state commerce. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,
305 U. S. 434 (1939); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938); J. D. Adams Mfg. Go. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307 (1938). Often the solution when several states possess contacts
with the same interstate commerce is for the Court to select the state
having the "dominant" contact, or the state possessing the majority
of contacts, and to allow only that state to tax. Interstate Oil Pipe
Line Go. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662 (1949); Northwest Airlines v. Minne-
sota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.
S. 33 (1939). While the Court, applying the "direct-indirect" test, has
continued to hold taxes on interstate gross receipts to be within the
exclusive category, an exception is made when the tax is apportioned.
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealy, 334 U. S. 653 (1948); Maine v.
Grand Trunk R. Go., 142 U. S. 217 (1891). Under this test a state tax
which directly burdens interstate commerce is invalid while one which
indirectly burdens such commerce is probably valid. Joseph v. Carter
& Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947); Freeman v. Hewit.
329 U. S. 249 (1946).
From these recent developments it would seem to follow that in
the instant case Connecticut had constitutional power to tax. The State
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shared with other jurisdictions in which the corporation operates
extensive contacts that would justify the reasonably allocated tax
actually imposed. But the Court, emphasizing the descriptive name of
the tax, regarded the case as controlled by the earlier "privilege" cases.
Mr. Justice Clark in a strongly worded dissenting opinion insisted
that there was no apparent difference between an "exclusively inter-
state" business and a "mixed intrastate and interstate" business which
would warrant different constitutional regard. Of large significance
to the "label" approach taken by the majority is the fact that at the
regular session of the Connecticut General Assembly, January, 1951,
the statute was so altered that now the tax is paid in return for the
benefits and protection afforded by the state. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 396b,
398b (Supp. 1951). Whether this change will bring this type of
statute within the state taxing power remains unresolved.
William R. Coen
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS -
IN PERSONAM1 JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The plaintiff sued a Massachusetts corporation for damage re-
sulting from the defendant's negligence in repairing a roof. Service
was made on the defendant under a statute which provides that if a
foreign corporation commits a tort in Vermont against a resident of
that state, such act shall be deemed as doing business there and shall
be equivalent to an appointment of the Secretary of State as its
attorney to receive process in an action arising from the tort. VT. PUB.
LAWs §1562 (1947). In the trial court the constitutionality of the
statute was attacked, but not ruled on. On appeal, held, the statute
does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteeenth Amendment.
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 80 A. 2d 664 (Vermont,
May, 1951).
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in
personam over nonresidents rested on their de facto power over the
defendant's person. But with the advent of statutes authorizing service
of process by means other than personal service, a foreign corporation
has been held subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state if
deemed to be doing business therein. Commercial Mutual Accident
Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909); Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castle-
man, 215 U.S. 437 (1910). Jurisdiction, in the absence of actual con-
sent to be sued, has been justified on the strength of the theories of
"implied consent," Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley,
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172 U.S. 602 (1899), and "presence" within the jurisdiction, Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). But under
either theory the general rule has been that a continuous course of
business, as opposed to single or isolated activity, is required by due
process to constitute "doing business" within the state. Rosenburg
Bros. 8& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Sasnett v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 90 F. 2d 514 (Eighth Cir. 1937), cert.
denied 302 U.S. 711 (1937).
In 1945 the Supreme Court of the United States expressly re-
pudiated the fictional theories of "implied consent" and "presence"
and established in their place the more realistic "contact" approach in
determining this question of jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In that case Chief Justice Stone
stated at p. 316, "' . . .due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice'." As to what contacts are
sufficient to satisfy due process the Court said at p. 317, " ...such
contacts of the corporation within the state of the forum as to make it
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there." The Court further stated at p. 319 that " . . . the quality and
nature of the activity . . . " rather than its quantity is the relevant
consideration. This case advocates tests for jurisdictional power over
foreign corporations not unlike those employed in deciding a question
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The principal case is evidence of the fact that the International
Shoe decision has substantially increased the possible liability of
foreign corporations, with respect to in personam suits, in states where
they engage in casual or sporadic activity. The court relied heavily on
that decision as overruling all previous law on the question. If it had
employed the "implied consent" or "presence" theories, it is quite
doubtful that the constitutionality of the statute would have been
upheld. Can it be said that requiring a Massachusetts corporation to
defend in Vermont an action upon a tort which it had committed
there offends "fair play and substantial justice" or is "unreasonable"?
It seems rather that the "contact" theory of the Supreme Court, as
exemplified by the principal case, has become a realistic approach
toward accomplishing justice in the individual case. The practical
considerations of convenience, trial expediency, and reasonableness
still serve to protect the corporation from undue hardship in defending
a suit in another state.
Richard G. Ison
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CRIMINAL LAWr - DOUBLE JEOPARDY - CONVICTION ON Two OFFENSES
BASED UPON SAME TRANSACTION
The defendant was convicted as a principal in issuing four "no-
account" checks with intent to defraud, of aiding and abetting in
issuing the four checks, and of larceny by trick in using the checks to
obtain automobiles. OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 710-176, 12380, 12447-1. The
Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal.
Upon rehearing the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction on one
of the three counts of each of the four indictments, holding that con-
viction on more than one would violate Article I, Section 10 of the
Ohio Constitution which reads in part, "No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense." The court reasoned that only one
conviction on each indictment was justified since the offenses charged
were predicated upon the same transaction and were related to the
same subject matter. State v. Greeno, 89 Ohio App. 241, 101 N.E. 2d
295 (1951); appeal dismissed, 155 Ohio St. 589, 99 N.E. 2d 613 (1951).
Logically a person could not be convicted as an aidor and abettor
and as a principal in the first degree for the same act. It is difficult to
see why separate counts were used since one indicted as a principal
may be convicted as an aidor and abettor. Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St.
178, 41 Am. Rep. 496 (1881); Hornsby v. State, 29 Ohio App. 495, 163
N.E. 923 (1928). However, a person could be convicted both for being
a principal or an aidor and abettor and for larceny by trick, depending
upon what double jeopardy test is used by the court.
In sixteenth century England, death was the penalty for many
minor offenses. The original development of the double jeopardy con-
cept was an attempt on the part of the courts to restrict liability when
the severity of punishment meted out far exceeded the gravity of the
offense. Horack, The Multiple Consequences Of A Single Criminal
Act, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1937); Note, 57 YALE L. J. 132 (1947).
This reason no longer exists. In fact the pendulum has swung the
other way and courts are now finding means of avoiding double
jeopardy to enable the state to insure and sometimes increase punish-
ment for wrongful acts. Legislative action in defining the same
criminal behavior in a slightly different manner in several statutes has
aided prosecutors and the courts to avoid double jeopardy limitations.
Three main tests have developed for judging double jeopardy.
These are the single intent test, the same transaction test, and the
same evidence rule.
The single intent test is self explanatory. If the defendant's action
is referable to a single criminal intent, he has committed only one
offense. This test is not recognized in Ohio and rarely used elsewhere.
Comment, 38 J. CRim. L. 379 (1947). Applied to the principal case the
single intent test would permit conviction on only one count. The
[Vol. 13
RECENT DECISIONS
inability to conclusively determine intent is the great weakness of this
test. Needless to say this test is highly favorable to the defendant.
The same transaction test, adopted in the principal case, would
prevent a second prosecution when the proof shows that the second
offense charged concerns the same transaction as the first even though
additional elements need to be proved. This also is a defendant's rule
and is followed by a steadily decreasing minority. Kirchheimer, The
Act, The Offense And Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L. J. 513 (1949).
The same evidence rule has been dearly stated: "A conviction or
acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and
sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a
conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a
conviction upon the other." Note, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522 (1940).
An examination of Griffith v. State, 93 Ohio St. 294, 112 N.E.
1017 (1915) and Devere v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. R. 509, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec.
249 (1890), the two cases mainly relied upon by the principal case,
will show that they used the same transaction test. The results favor-
able to the defendant are not surprising. The same transaction test,
while going into eclipse, has never been expressly repudiated in Ohio,
although the leading case, State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50
(1914), comes close to repudiation in holding the phrase same offense
to mean "same offense, not the same transaction, not the same act,
not the same circumstances or the same situation." The Rose case is
cited more as indicating approval of the same evidence rule than as
rejecting the same transaction test although most of the opinions citing
the Rose case also contain the above quotation. State v. Duvall, 111
Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96
N.E. 2d 776 (1951). The acceptance of either test in a given case usual-
ly requires rejection of the other. The principal case indicates that
Ohio appellate courts desiring to reduce unjustifiably heavy sentences
meted out by trial judges may find convenient precedents in some of
the older cases. If predictability of results is desirable in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice, it would seem that this judicial technique
is somewhat questionable.
In the Griffith case, supra, the defendant claimed the third count
should be barred since he was previously convicted of embezzling part
of the amount he was now charged with obtaining by false pretenses.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant could not ne convicted
of both embezzlement and obtaining by false pretenses in reference to
the same money or property. This is correct since the two crimes as to
the same property are mutually exclusive. Proof of one automatically
eliminates the other. The Griffith case, supra, on the facts, is not
analogous to the principal case since issuing a check with intent to
defraud and larceny by trick are not mutually exclusive.
In the Devere case, supra, the defendant was convicted of forgery
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and of uttering a forged note, both counts relating to the same note.
This was held error. But Dinsmore v. Alvis, 88 Ohio App. 32, 96 N.E.
2d 427 (1950), holds that such an indictment charges two separate
offenses. The fact that the Dinsmore case, supra, adopts the same
evidence rule explains the conflict. The Dinsmore case, supra, follows
the majority rule that the crimes of forgery and of uttering a forged
instrument are two distinct offenses and prosecution for one is not a
bar to prosecution for the other. Beyerline v. State, 147 Ind. 125, 45
N.E. 772 (1897); 22 C.J.S. 434.
The same evidence rule is the current general rule in Ohio, the
Federal courts, and in a majority of the state courts. State v. Rose,
supra; State v. Martin, supra; Gravieres v. U.S., 220 U.S. 338, 31 S. Ct.
421 (1911); Blockberger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932);
Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense And Double Jeopardy, supra. An
early Ohio case, Price v. State, 19 Ohio 423 (1850), providing authority
for the rule predates the Rose case, supra, cited in the principal case.
This rule favors the prosecution in view of the modern profusion of
statutory crimes grouped around one central subject matter and vary-
ing only slightly in ingredients.
Section 710-176 of the Ohio General Code makes it a felony for
any person with intent to defraud to make, draw, utter, or deliver
any check not covered by deposited funds. The making, drawing, etc.
is considered prima facie evidence of such intent. Section 12447-1
makes it a felony to obtain possession of anything of value with the
consent of the owner when such consent is induced by fraud. Fraudulent
intent is a necessary requisite of both offenses. However under the
former only the issuance of a bogus check need be shown while under
the latter something of value (in the principal case automobiles) must
be fraudulently taken from the owner with his consent. Under the
same evidence rule a conviction, as in the principal case, on counts
based on the statutes would not violate double jeopardy.
Thus, to determine double jeopardy, the courts have developed
three distinct tests: the single intent test, the same transaction test, and
the same evidence rule. As indicated, the single intent test and the
same transacion test favor the defendant while the same evidence rule
helps the prosecution. It appears that the courts use whichever test
will best rationalize their desired decision. This decision in turn de-
pends a great deal upon the amount of punishment the offender
deserves in the light of his background as a suspected or known
criminal, and the surrounding circumstances of the instant crime.
Generally appellate courts are not permitted to regulate sentences
imposed by trial courts if within statutory maxima. See Hall, Re-
duction Of Criminal Sentences On Appeal, 37 COL. L. Rmv. 521. Resort
is thus made to the above tests. Perhaps the real problem is whether
the appellate courts should regulate sentences or whether some over-
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seeing agency, equipped with expert and experienced penologists,
should have the power to equalize sentences according to uniform
policy.
James D. Oglevee
INJUNCTIONS - ALIMONY ACTION - PERSONAL RIGHTS
Plaintiff brought an alimony action and requested in addition
to the usual relief that during the pendency of the action a temporary
restraining order be issued restraining the defendant third party
from associating in any manner with the defendant husband or inter-
fering with the marriage relationship. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant third party had enticed the defendant husband to leave the
plaintiff and transfer his affections to her. The Court of Common
Pleas held that since the pertinent allegations of the complaint were
conceded, the temporary order should issue to restrain the third party
defendant from interfering with the marriage relation and to restrain
both defendants from contacting each other. Pashko v. Pashko, 45
Ohio Op. 498, 101 N.E. 2d 804 (1951).
Historically Equity refused to take jurisdiction in any case unless
property rights were involved. Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586, 27 Atl.
591 (1892); see 14 A.L.R. 295 (1921). The modern trend, however, is
to extend the jurisdiction of Equity to the protection of rights in
personality in proper cases. Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d
852 (1942); Hawke v. Yancy, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); see
175 A.L.R. 438 (1948). In the field of domestic relations this trend has
taken several forms. Some courts, while voicing adherence to the
older doctrine of protecting only property rights, actually protect
rights of a purely personal nature by finding some tenuous property
right on which to base jurisdiction. For instance, in Stark v. Hamilton,
149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919), the court granted an injunction to
restrain a man from associating with the plaintiff's minor daughter
whom the man had debauched. Jurisdiction was based on the father's
property right in the services of his daughter. Other courts have based
jurisdiction on property rights while indicating that they probably
would have taken jurisdiction to protect the purely personal rights
even in the absence of a property right. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72
N.J.Eq. 910, 67 At. 97 (1907) Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S.W. 2d
633 (1937). A third group of courts protect purely personal rights
without discussing the jurisdictional question. Smith v. Womack, 271
S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Witte v. Brauderer, 255 S.W. 1015
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(Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Finally, the more progressive courts have
completely repudiated the "property right" doctrine and assert juris-
diction to protect purely personal rights in proper cases. Henley v.
Rockett, supra; Hawke v. Yancy, supra. For example, in the Hawke
case, supra, an injunction was granted to protect a woman from a man
with whom she had had an illicit relationship and who was attempting
to prevent her marriage to another.
Although the strict "property right" doctrine has been somewhat
repudiated in Ohio, the general question still remains unsettled. 16 0.
Jur., Equity §85 (1931); 21 0. Jur., Injunctions §112 (1937). In 1924
the Supreme Court refused an injunction in an alienation of affections
case, and stated that the jurisdiction of equity did not extend to the
regulation and control of domestic relations. Snedaker v. King. 111
Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924). The principal case was distinguished
on the ground that it was an alimony action in a court of domestic
relations in which the plaintiff sought only a temporary injunction,
whereas the Snedaker case, supra, was an original action in a court of
equity in which the plaintiff sought a permanent injunction. Super-
ficially, this distinction seems invalid. A temporary injunction will
issue only where the party seeking it would be entitled to a permanent
injunction, or where it appears that the defendant is doing or is about
to do some act respecting the subject of the action which would render
the final judgment ineffectual. 21 0. Jur., Injunctions §§49 and 51
(1932). In the principal case neither condition was satisfied. If, how-
ever, the distinction is considered in connection with In Re Cattell,
146 Ohio St. 112, 64 N.E. 2d 416 (1946), cited in the principal case,
it takes on a new perspective. In that case the court granted a temporary
order restraining the defendant husband in a divorce action from
interfering with his wife's exclusive use and occupancy of the home.
Its purpose was to prevent the husband from subjecting his wife to
continued physical violence. The Court relied on Section 11876 of
the General Code which authorizes the issuance of a temporary re-
straining order or injunction when it appears by the petition that
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief or any
part of it consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
some act, the commission or continuance of which would produce
great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff. This is significant in that
Section 11876 is not a part of the Domestic Relations Code.
Considered together with the Cattell case, supra, the principal
case thus indicates that Section 11876 of the General Code applies in
the courts of domestic relations. Unless these two cases are overruled
or limited by the Supreme Court, the principal case is a step forward
and the yoke of the Snedaker case, supra, has been partially removed.
Thomas E. Jenks
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INJUNCTIONS - NEGATIVE COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE
The defendant was a barber employed in his father's shop. He
had no interest in the business as a partner or otherwise. Ancillary to
a sale of the shop to the plaintiffs, the defendant was required, along
with his father, to sign an agreement that he would not engage in
the trade of barbering within a certain radius for a fixed period of
time. After the defendant accepted temporary employment in another
barber shop plaintiffs sought an injunction, which was denied. From
a decree for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, held,
affirmed. "In no event could the covenant be valid," said the Court,
"unless it was reasonably necessary for the fair and just protection of
the good will of the business sold, and no such necessity had been
shown." Domurat et al. v. Mazzaccoli, 138 Conn. 327, 84 A. 2d
271 (1951).
It is a settled rule that where, upon the sale of a business, an
agreement is entered into restricting the right of one of the parties to
compete in a similar business, such agreements, if valid within the
rules governing contracts in restraint of trade, will be enforced in
equity by enjoining its breach. Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517,
38 Am. St. Rep. 607 (1881). The contract must be founded on valuable
consideration and be reasonable and not oppressive. Toledo Breweries
Co. v. Zevnick, 4 Ohio N. P. N. S. 193, 16 Ohio Dec. 493 (1906).
It is generally held that even in the absence of an express agree-
ment a seller of a business or trade and its good will is precluded from
interfering with the purchaser in his right to enjoy all the advantages
that inhere to the premises used as the place of business. Fine v. Law-
less, 139 Tenn. 160, 201 S. W. 160 (1918).
The problem raised by the principal case is the enforceability of
negative covenants not to compete made by a signer who had no in-
terest in the business sold. Two main issues have been raised in these
cases. Is it necessary for the covenantor to have an interest in the
property sold? Assuming such an interest is not necessary, may the
restraint be validly imposed?
An indirect interest, such as being a stockholder in the business
sold, has been held as sufficient to bind the covenantor. Bloom v. Home
Ins. Agency, 91 Ark. 367, 121 S. W. 293 (1909). In California it has
been intimated that a vendible interest on the part of the covenantor
is necessary to the validity of the covenant as against him. California
Linoleum & Shade Supplies v. Schultz, 105 Cal. App. 471, 287 Pac. 980
(1930). Some courts have enforced negative covenants on a mere
showing of consideration, where the interest of the covenantor wasn't
urged. Durham v. Lewis, 231 Ky. 601, 21 S. W. 2d 1004 (1929); Sch-
neiderman v. Stern, 93 N. J. Eq. 626, 117 At. 631 (1922). A case
decided under a Michigan statute, making certain contracts in re-
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straint of trade valid, is regarded as a distinct authority for the view
that it is not necessary to the validity of the covenant as against a
particular covenantor, that he should have an interest in the property
sold. The purchase price given to the defendants' father and uncle for
the sale of a dairy business was held as sufficient consideration to bind
the defendants and to enjoin them from carrying on a corporation
in competition with the plaintiff's business. The defendants had
taken an active part in the management and contacts of the business
sold. Arctic Dairy Co. v. Winans, 267 Mich. 80, 255 N. W. 290 (1934).
The consideration necessary to bind the covenantor need not move
to him if the buyer can show he parted with something at the covenan-
tor's request and benefited a third party. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 384.
If the answer to the first problem is that an interest in the business
is not necessary to bind the covenantor, may such a restraint be validly
imposed? It has been regarded as sufficient to enforcement if the
covenantor was prominent in the business at the place in question.
Arctic Dairy Co. v. Winans, supra. However, even where the covenan-
tor is manager of the business, the covenantee must still show irrepar-
able harm. Menter v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N. W. 553 (1920).
The position the covenantor must hold in the business sold, before
the courts will enjoin him from competing, is difficult to define. The
test used by most courts is that the restraint imposed should be no
greater than is necessary for the fair and just protection of the business
sold and does not impose unnecessary hardship on the covenantor.
Gates - McDonald Co. v. McQuilkin, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 34 N. E.
2d 443 (1941).
The principal case relied solely on the fact that the plaintiff
could show no harm done to the good will of his business by the
defendant's employment in another shop. The court said further that
the plaintiff must show not only that the defendant will take away
customers from the barber shop, but that the customers must have
been followers of the shop, rather than personal followers of the de-
fendant. It would seem that such a line would be difficult to draw, and
that the court is attempting to put a greater burden on the plaintiff
of showing irreparable harm, when the covenant is made by one who
has no interest in the business sold. The problems concerning nec-
essary interest in the business, and consideration for the covenant
were not discussed.
Most courts would agree that covenants in restraint of trade are
to be strictly construed. Schroeder v. Schultz, 160 Ohio C. C. N. S. 193,
36 Ohio C. D. 570 (1913). However, without the signatures of close
relatives who work in the business, oftimes the sale would not take
place. Without their signatures an attempt of an effective transfer and
protection of goodwill would be mere idle gesture. No hard and fast
rule can be employed by the courts to decide these cases. The present
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problem is the same that arises in those cases involving unfair com-
petition. The court should balance the rights of both parties so that
each may carry on his business or calling with the greatest freedom
consistant with a similar right in the other. This same standard should
apply whether the covenantor has an interest in the business sold
or not.
Harold Talisman
NEGLIGENCE - CHARnIEs - LIABILITY FOR TORTS
While transporting the plaintiff, a nonpaying patient in de-
fendant charitable hospital, a nurse's aide, although she realized as-
sistance was needed, nevertheless attempted to wheel the plaintiff
down a ramp unassisted. The employee lost control of the stretcher,
and as a result the plaintiff was injured. In a suit against the hospital,
the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that
it was a charitable institution. Held, reversed and remanded. The
trial court committed error by withdrawing from the jury the question
of whether the defendant exercised due care in employing the nurse's
aide. The Supreme Court also expressly overruled its prior holding
and now imposes complete liability on charitable institutions for the
negligence of their servants. Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz.
22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951).
Several reasons or theories have been advanced by the courts in
limiting or denying the liability of corporate charitable institutions.
These theories have been criticized severely by most legal writers as
being unsound and contradictory. PROSSER, TORTS, 1079 (1941); HAR-
PER, TORTS §294 (1933); Scorr, TRUSTS §402 (1939); BOGERT, TRUST AND
TRUSTEES §731-35 (1935); Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77
U. PA. L. REv. 191 (1928).
The trust fund theory is grounded in the reasoning that the funds
and property of these institutions are held in trust and cannot be
diverted to purposes other than those designated in the trust. 10 Am.
Jur. 695; Sco-rr, TRUSTS §402. This theory in practice has proven
extremely illogical, for many of the states that follow it impose liability
in favor of strangers or paying beneficiaries. Bruce v. Central Methodist
Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907). If the reason-
ing in the rule is analyzed it must apply to all classes without
exception.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is another theory advanced
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by several courts in denying the liability of corporate charitable in-
stitutions, the theory being that since these institutions are not op-
erated for profit respondeat superior does not apply. Emory v. Jewish
Hosp. Ass'n., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921). Again the courts in an
all-exclusive doctrine fall into inconsistency by making the charity
liable if its officers are negligent in hiring, or if the injured person is
not a beneficiary. Cullen v. Schmidt, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E. 2d 146
(1942); RESTATEMENT, TRusTs §402.
The implied waiver theory advanced by few courts is based on
implied contract, in that the patient who accepts the services rendered
him waives all rights to claim damages for injuries sustained by the
negligence of the hospital. Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium and Bene-
volent Ass'n., 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120 (1912). This theory has re-
ceived extreme criticism. 10 Am. Jur. 694; ScoTT, TRUSTS §402.
Several courts base the doctrine of immunity on public policy.
They are of the opinion that to allow recovery would be against
society's best interests in that it would militate against charitable gifts.
Weston's Adm'x. v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107
S.E. 785 (1921). This theory is the most persuasive and probably is
influential in those courts which base their decisions on the other
-theories.
The conflict among the courts is discussed by Justice Rutledge in
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d
810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Paradoxes of principle, fictional assumptions of fact and con-
sequence, and confused results characterize judical disposition
of these claims. From full immunity, through varied but in-
consistent qualifications to general responsibility is the gamut
of decision. The cases are almost riotous with dissent.
Reasons are even more varied than results. These are ear-
marks of law in flux. They indicate something wrong at the
beginning or that something has become wrong since then.
They also show that correction though in process, is in-
complete.
The principle that charities are not liable for torts of their
servants has so many exceptions and qualifications that it is doubtful
to say it is the general rule. Many of the courts differentiate their
holdings depending upon whether the injured party be a stranger,
beneficiary, nonpaying beneficiary or an employee. In many states
beneficiaries are denied recovery but a stranger may recover. Cullen v.
Schmidt, supra; Cohen v. General Hospital Soc. of Connecticut, 113
Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931). In several states paying beneficiaries
mwa recover. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4
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(1915); Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 55
Ga. App. 469, 190 S.E. 432 (1937). The majority of states deny re-
covery to nonpaying patients but the few jurisdictions that have al-
lowed recovery have adopted the full liability rule. Geiger v. Simpson
Methodist-Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463, 62 A.L.R.
716 (1928); Fosterv. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124,
70 A. 2d 230 (1950). Liability has also been imposed when the injured
person is an employee of the charity. Cowans v. North Carolina Bap-
tist Hospitals, Inc., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929). A few jurisdictions
hold the corporation liable to the extent of property owned for in-
come and not used directly in carrying on the charitable enterprise.
Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918) ; Baptist
Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S.W. 2d 1088
(1940). Liability may also be imposed if the charity is covered by in-
surance. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n., 105 Colo.
259, 96 P. 2d 835, 133 A.L.R. 819 (1939); Vanderbilt University v.
Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W. 2d 284 (1938). With all the
conflict and exceptions to immunity several states still adhere to the
full immunity doctrine. Arkansas Valley Co-op Rural Electric Co. v.
Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W. 2d 538 (1940); Webb v. Vought, 127
Kan. 779, 275 P. 170 (1929).
Prior to the decision laid down in the principal case Arizona had
held that charitable institutions were not liable for the torts of their
servants where due care had been exercised in the selection of the
employee. Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium of Tucson v.
Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. 2d 118 (1935). The Arizona court, in over-
ruling the doctrine of limited liability, expressed doubt that any valid
reasons had ever existed for holding charitable institutions immune
and stated that if such reasons existed in the past they are today out-
weighed by such considerations as the size of charities, the injustice to
the injured, insurance programs, and the obvious legal inconsistency
underlying the reasons in limiting liability.
Ohio has not yet adopted full liability for charitable institutions.
It adheres to the view that a stranger may recover but a paying or
non-paying beneficiary is denied recovery unless the hospital was
negligent in hiring the responsible employee. Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922);
Cullen v. Schmidt, supra; Newman v. Cleveland Museum, 143 Ohio
St. 369, 55 N. E. 2d 575 (1944). The more logical view, as expressed in
the principal case, is to hold charitable institutions liable for negligent
acts. This is evidenced by a growing tendency in the courts to revoke
the historical immunity of charities.
Thomas E. Cavendish
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - HOLDER IN DUE COURSE -
COMPLETE AND REGULAR ON ITS FACE
The defendant auto agency sold a car to Lynch, receiving a note
for a portion of the purchase price. Lynch signed the form note, and
the auto agency took it to a discount company, where the proper
figures were inserted, and the note was then indorsed by the auto
agency to the discount company. When no payment was made on the
note, the discount company brought suit against Lynch, only then
discovering that Lynch, who had represented his age as 21, was in fact
an infant and not bound. The discount company thereupon sued the
auto agency as indorser. The defendant contends the plaintiff is not
a holder in due course, since the blanks in the instrument were not
filled completely at the time of its negotiation to the plaintiff. On
appeal by defendant, held, affirmed. The plaintiff is a holder in due
course, under the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. First Discount Corp. v. Hatcher, 156 Ohio St. 191, 102 N.E.
2d 4 (1951).
Section 8157 of the Ohio General Code (NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW §52) reads: "One is a holder in due course who has taken the in-
strument under the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and
regular upon its face .. . . (3) That he took it in good faith and for
value. (4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice
of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it." Section 8119 of the Ohio General Code (NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW § 14) reads: ". .. In order, however, that such an
instrument (i.e. an incomplete instrument) when completed may be
enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its
completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the author-
ity given and within a reasonable time. But if such an instrument
after completion is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid
and effectual . . ."
Section 8119, by implication, and Section 8157, more affirmatively,
thus declare the rule that a purchaser of an instrument prior to
completion, or contemporaneously with the act of completion, cannot
be a holder in due course. Dumbrow v. Gelb, 72 Misc. 400, 130 N.Y.S.
182 (1911); Bronson v. Stetson, 252 Mich. 6, 232 N.W. 741 (1930);
BRIrrON, BILLS AND NOTES §86 (1943). But it may be seen that the
statute does not specifically refer to the taking of a completed instru-
ment with knowledge that it has been filled in by a person not the
maker.
In an early English case, an indorsee taking an instrument con-
taining blank spaces was not charged with notice, Lord Mansfield
stating, "The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an
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indefinite sum. The defendant said, 'Trust Galley to any amount and
I will be his security.' It does not lie in his mouth to say the indorse-
ments were not regular." Russell v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514 (1781).
This was the view of the American common law cases. Fullerton v.
Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 530 (1855); Orrich v. Colston, 7 Gratt. (Va.)
189 (1850).
The Negotiable Instruments Law codifies a later English rule to
the effect that an indorsee accepting an instrument containing blanks
is taking in bad faith, and of course cannot be a holder in due course.
See I DANiEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 114 (7th ed. 1933). This pro-
vision seems to have been applied by the courts at times with reluc-
tance, Bronson v. Stetson, supra, and at other times with confusion.
See BRITrON, BiLs AND NoTEs § 114 (1943). Courts prefer to look to the
circumstances of the case, and then base their decisions upon whether
the holder was in good faith. The New Jersey Superior Court has
stated that if the indorsee does not have actual notice of fraud, but
merely notice of suspicious circumstances, he will be a holder in due
course, even though the blank instrument was filled in the indorsee's
presence by a third person. First National Bank of Springfield v. Di
Taranto, 9 N.J. Sup. Ct. Rep. 246, 75 A. 2d 907 (1950). A District of
Columbia court, on similar facts, stated that "the endorsee of an
instrument containing a blank as to any material part is not a holder
in due course.... " Zier v. Eastern Acceptance Corporation, 61 A. 2d
106 (1948). In the former case, the indorsee had no knowledge of any
fraud on the part of the indorser; the latter case involved a "detached"
or "perforated" note situation, and the court viewed the indorsee's
claim of innocence with a skeptical eye.
With this background, then, it may more easily be seen why, in
the instant case, Chief Justice Weygandt states, "Clearly the plaintiff
is a holder in due course," while Judge Taft in the concurring opinion
can not see how the instrument was complete and regular upon its
face at the time the plaintiff took it.
It is interesting to note that the proposed Uniform Commercial
Code would change Section 8157 of the Ohio General Code to read as
follows: " (1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instru-
ment (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that
it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim
to it on the part of any person." UNrFORm CoMMERcIAL CoDE (Pro-
posed Final Draft, Spring 1950) 336. In defining notice, the proposed
code on page 342 states: " (5) Knowledge of the following facts does
not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim (d) that
an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser
has notice of any improper completion." The comment to Section 5 (d)
of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code states, "It is intended to
mean that the holder may take in due course even though a blank is
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filled in his presence, if he is without notice that the filling is im-
proper." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Proposed Final Draft, Spring
1950) 345. Passage of the Uniform Commercial Code would resolve
the uncertainty of Sections 8119 and 8157 of the Ohio General Code
and prevent controversies such as are presented in the instant case.
Victor F. Greenslade
THE SIGNIFICANCE Ol AN Omo CERTIFICATE OF Trr=
Plaintiff sold an automobile to a buyer in California and reserved
title under a conditional sale contract. The buyer removed the auto-
mobile to Vermont and there secured a certificate of title on which
there was no notation of any liens. Subsequently the buyer procured
an Ohio certificate of title as a replacement for the one obtained in
Vermont. There was no notation of any lien on this certificate. Buyer
then sold the automobile to defendant, a bona fide purchaser, to whom
the certificate of title was transferred. This certificate also had no
liens noted upon it. Plaintiff brought replevin against defendant
based on his reserved title under the conditional sale. Held, the Certi-
ficate of Title Act does not permit an Ohio court to recognize any
interest in a motor vehicle unless it is evidenced by a certificate of
title issued in accordance with the provisions of the Certificate of
Title Act. Since plaintiff had no certificate, and there was no notation
of plaintiff's interest on defendant's certificate of title, plaintiff cannot
recover. The Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N. E. (2d)
665 (1951).
The Ohio Certificate of Title Act became effective January 1, 1938.
OHIO GEN. CODE §§6290-2 et seq. (1938). Prior to that time the settled
law of Ohio was clearly expressed in the cases of Kanaga v. Taylor, 7
Ohio St. 134 (1856), and Reising v. Universal Credit Co., 50 Ohio
App. 289, 198 N. E. 52 (1935). These cases supplied the rule, based on
comity, that the interest of a conditional vendor or mortgagee in a
foreign state would prevail over a subsequent bona fide purchaser
in Ohio.
It was contended, however, that the Certificate of Title Act
changed this rule. The pertinent part of the Certificate of Title Act
is found in Section 6290-4 of the Ohio General Code. It reads: " ... No
court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title,
claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle, hereafter
sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by
a certificate of title or manufacturer's or importer's certificate duly
issued, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."
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The Certificate of Title law constitutes an authorized exercise of
the police power on the part of the General Assembly and does not
violate any of the provisions of the state or federal Constitution. The
State, ex rel. The City Loan and Savings Co. v. Taggart, Recorder, 134
Ohio St. 374, 17 N. E. 2d 758 (1938).
Before December 31, 1940, four Ohio Courts of Appeals had
occasion to consider cases that had some relation to the Certificate
of Title Act. A holder of a chattel mortgage and manufacturer's
certificate of title had a lien superior to that of a buyer without a certi-
ficate of title in Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25
N. E. 2d 306 (1939). In Union Commercial Corp. v. R. J. Schmuck
Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 116 (1939), a foreign mortgagee could not succeed
in his replevin action against an Ohio bona fide purchaser holding a
certificate of title with no notation of the foreign mortgagee's lien
upon it. In another replevin action, a buyer of an automobile whose
certificate of title was obtained by the forgery of the dealer who had
sold him the automobile, was successful against the assignee of a
forged note. Lazerick v. Associate Investment Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 112
(1939). Likewise, in a personal injury action, an automobile dealer
and not the purchaser was deemed to be the owner of the car because
the purchaser did not have a certificate of title. Fredericks v. Birkett
L. William's Co., 68 Ohio App. 217, 40 N. E. 2d 162 (1940).
Later in a case where the plaintiff, a holder of a note and mort-
gage, was attempting to rely on a certificate of title procured by
fraud in order to replevin an automobile from the defendant who had
purchased it from a dealer, the Ohio Supreme Court held the certificate
of title was void ab initio because of the fraud and plaintiff must
therefore fail in his replevin action since he must produce a valid
certificate to prove his ownership. Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday,
137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N. E. 2d 1002 (1940).
This decision has served as a guide for some Ohio'courts as to
the status of the certificate of title in other situations. Thus, in As-
sociates Investment Co. v. LeBoutillier, Jr., 69 Ohio App. 62, 42 N. E.
2d 1011 (1941), a local mortgagee having a manufacturer's certi-
ficate of title was allowed to replevin an automobile from a purchaser
who did not have a certificate of title issued. An Indiana plaintiff
could not foreclose his lien on an automobile brought to Ohio and
sold to a bona fide purchaser who received a certificate of title with
no notation of plaintiff's lien thereon. Schiefer v. Schnaufer, et al., 71
Ohio App. 43, 50 N. E. 2d 365 (1943).
Others-have felt that the decision did not provide an iron-clad
rule for all situations in which the certificate of title may be involved.
In Workman and Sayles v. Republic Mutual Insurance Co., 40 Ohio
L. Abs. 450, 53 N. E. 2d 833 (1943), the plaintiff automobile dealer
was held not to have an interest in an automobile sold to a purchaser
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notwithstanding the fact that the purchaser did not have any property
interest because of his lack of a certificate of title.
Still later, two Ohio Courts of Appeals having before them out
of state equities as opposed to a local bona fide purchaser with a
certificate of title clear on its face, decided to follow the Munday case,
supra. In one, the owner from Pennsylvania was permitted to replevin
an automobile stolen in Pennsylvania and later sold in Ohio, even
though the bona fide purchaser in Ohio had a certificate clear on its
face. The court held that the bona fide purchaser's title emanated
from one procured by fraud and thus was void ab initio as was stated
in the Munday case. Mock v. Kaffits, Chief of Police, et al., 75 Ohio
App. 305, 62 N. E. 2d 172 (1944). In the other case, the conditional
vendor from New York was permitted to foreclose on his conditional
sales contract in spite of the fact that the defendant bona fide pur-
chaser in Ohio had a clear certificate of title. This defendant's chain
of title had likewise originated in a fraudulent procurement of a
certificate of title in Ohio. Associates Discount Corp. v. Colonial
Finance Co., et al., 88 Ohio App. 250, 98 N. E. 2d 848 (1950).
This latter decision was rendered in view of the express words of
Ohio General Code 6290-4 to the effect that no court shall recognize
any interest in a motor vehicle unless evidenced by a certificate of
title issued in accordance with the provisions of the Certificate of
Title Act. It was also rendered in the light of another Ohio Supreme
Court decision bearing upon motor vehicle title. Mielke, et al. v.
Leeberson, 150 Ohio St. 528 (1948). In this decision, .a plaintiff was
not permitted to maintain an action for damages to the car he was
driving unless he put in evidence the certificate of title showing that
he owned the car. The Court cast further light upon its attitude to-
ward the Act by holding that, "When the statute says 'no court in any
case at law or equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest
of any person in or to any motor vehicle, ... unless evidenced by a
certificate of title ... ' such language cannot possibly be restricted to
only cases involving transfer of title."
In the instant case, the Ohio Supreme Court continued to follow
the plain meaning of the words in Ohio General Code 6290-4 and pro-
tected, in a replevin action, the bona fide purchaser in Ohio even
though his clear certificate of title emanated from a fraudulently
procured certificate of title in Ohio. But the court clearly stated that
its decision was not to be construed as being contrary to any principle
announced in the Munday case, supra. It thus would seem that the
court will not permit a plaintiff to rely on a fraudulently procured
certificate of title to establish his ownership in a replevin action. How-
ever, it will permit a bona fide defendant having a certificate of title
running from one procured by fraud, to retain possession because the
plaintiff, not having complied with the Certificate of Title Act (but
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who has evidenced his interest by a certificate of title issued in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Act) cannot sustain his burden of
proving ownership. Thus, the court does not rely on the validity of the
defendant bona fide purchaser's certificate of title, but rather holds that
his possession will not be disturbed.
From the standpoint of the Ohio lawyer, these cases should tend
to indicate that the Certificate of Title Act is to be given a literal in-
terpretation. In the light of this, a lawyer, in any situation where
ownership of a motor vehicle is a factor, should, as a part of the proof
of his case, make certain that he produces a certificate of title.
Cornelius W. Dillon
TORTS - RIGHT OF PRIVACY - UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF
PHOTOGRAPH OF ACCIDENT VICTMIin
Plaintiff, a minor, was photographed as she lay in the street
immediately after being struck by a negligent motorist. The picture
was published by a local newspaper the following day and republished
in one of defendant's magazines twenty months later as an illustration
for an article dealing with the subject of pedestrian carelessness and
traffic accidents. Plaintiff brought an action for invasion of privacy in
the Federal District Court in Pennsylvania and received judgement.
Levertton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 97 F. Supp. 181 (E. D. Penn.
1951). On appeal, Held, affirmed. Publication of the photograph of an
accident victim as an illustration for a magazine article dealing not
with victim's accident but with the general subject of pedestrian care-
lessness and traffic accidents is an actionable invasion of victim's right
of privacy. Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F. 2d 974 (3rd
Cir. 1951).
The proposition is well established that the right of privacy does
not prevent the publication of a person's name, likeness or history
when there is a legitimate public interest in disclosure. Berg v. Min-
neapolis Star and Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.C. Minn. 1948);
See Themo v. New England Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 58, 27 N.E.
2d 753, 755 (1940); 138 A.L.R. 49 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 452 (1947); 14
A.L.R. 2d 759 (1950). This limitation includes disclosures respecting
persons who have voluntarily embarked upon a public career and are
considered as having waived their right of privacy, Corliss v. F. W.
Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C.C. Mass. 1894); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal.
App. 704, 211 P. 2d 320 (1949), and disclosures respecting persons who
involuntarily become newsworthy through involvement in or associa-
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tion with an event or occurrence in which the public has an interest
in being informed. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W. 2d
972 (1929); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 80 App. D. C. 372, 153 F. 2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1946); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §867, comment c (1934). It has
been further suggested, however, that whether the plaintiff "waives"
or loses his right of privacy, he is not deprived of his right to be free
from undesired publicity for all time and for all purposes but only to
the extent that disclosure is necessary in satisfying the legitimate
public desire for information concerning the activity or occurrence
in which the plaintiff is or has been involved. Pavesich v. New England
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); RySTATE-
MENT, TORTS, supra; 138 A.L.R. 61 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 455 (1947); 14
A.L.R. 2d 765 (1950).
It is in applying the latter standard that the greatest difficulty has
arisen, since the courts, in treating these cases, are faced with the im-
mediate problem of choosing between the sharply conflicting interests
of the individual in a maximum of seclusion and the interest of society
in unrestricted dissemination of information. For an excellent presen-
tation of the problem see Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MicII. L.
REv. 526, 528 (1941). Most courts would now agree that where the
disclosure takes the form of an advertisement, the plaintiff's status as
a public figure does not protect the defendant since advertisements
represent the clearest instances of appropriational harms. Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Pallas v.
Crowley, Milner and Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W. 2d 911 (1948); 138
A.L.R. 72 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 457 (1947); 14 A.L.R. 2d 766 (1950).
Contra, Martin v. FlY Theatre Co., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 67, 10 Ohio Op.
338 (1938); O'brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. 2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941)
(alternative holding). On the other hand, disclosures appearing in
newspaper accounts of recent events of general interest are clearly in-
formational in character and have been consistently held non-action-
able. Jones v. Herald Post Co., supra; Berg v. Minneapolis Tribune
Co., supra; cf. Elmhurst v. Pearson, supra. Cases arising under the
New York civil rights statute, N.w YoRK CiviL R G-Ts LAw, §§50, 51
(1948), which provides for injuntive relief and damages for unauthor-
ized use of a person's name or likeness for "advertising purposes, or
for the purposes of trade," have received similar treatment. Dis-
closures appearing in newspapers have been read out of the statute,
Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 570,
124 N.Y.S. 780 (1910); Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776,
295 N.Y.S. 382 (1937), while disclosures appearing in advertisements
are dearly within the statutory standard. Sinclair v. Postal Telegraph
Co., 72 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (1935); Fisher v. Murray Rosenberg, Inc., 175
Misc. 370, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 677 (1940).
Between these two extremes the disclosure may take any number
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of forms which are neither wholly informational nor wholly com-
mercial in nature. Radio programs, works of fiction, book biogra-
phies, motion pictures, comic books and most magazines fall into this
category and relief often depends upon whether or not the public
interest concept is held to be controlling. See Nizer, supra at 540 et
seq. Representative cases in which application of the public interest
limitation resulted in a denial of relief are: Cohen v. Marx, supra,
(use of the name of a retired prizefighter by a radio comedian); Smith
v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948) (disclosure of mysterious
disappearance of plaintiff's father on a local radio program called
"Town Talk"); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 238 P. 2d 670 (1951)
(use of a former serviceman's name in a motion picture dramatization
of a famous World War II battle). Under the New York statute, supra:
Coyler v. Richard K. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146
N.Y.S. 999 (1914) (picture of a professional diver printed, together
with four burlesque performers, on the cover of the "Police Gazette");
Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne and Heathe, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68
N.Y.S. 2d 779 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 432 (1947) (book
biography of famous musical conductor); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.,
113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940 ) (biographical sketch of a former child
prodigy in the "New Yorker" magazine); Wallach v. Bacharach, 192
Misc. 979, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 37, affd without opinion, 274 App. Div. 919,
84 N.Y.S. 2d 894 (1948) (use of a news article, in which plaintiffs
name appeared, in an advertisement). Representative cases in which
the public interest concept did not defeat recovery are: Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 2d 291 (1931) (motion picture dramatization
of life of former prostitute and criminal defendant); Mau v. Rio
Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Calif. 1939) (radio dramatiza-
tion of holdup in which plaintiff was victim); Reed v. Real Detective
Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945> (publication of
plaintiff's photograph in crime story magazine); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942) (picture of plaintiff, suffering
from a peculiar ailment causing an enormous increase in appetite,
published in weekly news magazine). Under the New York statute,
supra: Kreiger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S. 2d
480 (1938) (publication of prizefighter's name in a fictional story);
Moloney v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 188 Misc. 450, 65 N.Y.S. 2d
173 (1946) (Portrayal in a comic book of a living boy's experiences);
Binns v. Vitagraph Corporation of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E.
1108 (1913) (use of plaintiff's name and picture in motion picture
dramatization of newsworthy event in which plaintiff was involved.)
A recent law review writer, in commenting on some of these cases,
has observed that the courts, in determining when a commercial use
has occurred, have indulged in a "judicial evaluation of the informa-
tion value of each type of publication," relief being granted where the
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publication medium is judicially considered inferior but denied by
application of the public interest limitation where considered de-
sirable. Feinberg, Recent Developments In The Law Of Privacy, 48
CoL. L. REv. 713, 720 (1948). This analysis obviously fails to account
for a case like Barber v. Time, Inc., supra, which can probably best be
explained on the basis of the extreme offensiveness of disclosures of
peculiar illnesses. See PROSSER, TORTS, 1060 et seq. (1941). A better
approach, based upon neither the distinction between private and
public characters nor upon the type of publication medium involved,
is that suggested by Feinberg, supra at 720, and Nizer, supra at 556,
which would consist of a judicial appraisal of the information value
of the particular publication in issue.
While the passage of time between the occurrence of the news-
worthy event or retirement of the public character from public life
is negatively suggested by the Restatement, supra, as eventually work-
ing a restoration of the plaintiff's right to seclusion, this factor has
been either ignored or rejected by the courts. Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Co., supra; Cohen v. Marx, supra; Smith v. Doss, supra. In the Sidis
case, where the publication occurred thirty years after the plaintiff,
once a much publicized child prodigy, had withdrawn from public
life, the court rationalized the disclosure on the basis of a present
interest in the current status of a public figure who once held great
promise of success. Smith v. Doss cannot be disposed of on like
grounds. There the mysterious disappearance of plaintiff's father some
years earlier had led to the indictment and hcquittal of a local citizen
for murder. Subsequently it was discovered that the father had not
been murdered at all but had intentionally deserted his family and
had been living in another state. Sixteen years after the mystery had
been cleared up the defendant retold the story on a local radio program
and the court refused to hold the disclosure actionable. This decision
can hardly be justified on the basis of a legitimate current interest.
In Cohen v. Marx the court expressly rejected the claim of a former
prize-fighter, nine years retired, holding that upon entering the ring
the plaintiff had waived his right of privacy and could not, by with-
drawing, subsequently reassert it. Although the passage of time is in-
adequate in itself as a basis for relief, it may sometime be important
when combined with other circumstances. This is indicated by Melvin
v. Reid, supra, where the court expressly reacted to the fact that the
plaintiff, a former prostitute and criminal defendant, had for eight
years prior to publication been leading a rehabilitated life.
In the instant decision both the passage of twenty months between
the plaintiff's accident and the publication, and the "commercial
character" of the magazine in which the disclosure appeared are re-
jected as reasons for permitting the plaintiff to recover. Emphasized
instead is the fact that the article illustrated by the plaintiff's photo-
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graph did not deal at all with the plaintiff's accident but covered the
general subject of traffic accidents resulting from pedestrian careless-
ness. A standard thus formulated can obviously be of only limited
utility since in the great majority of these cases the disclosure appears
in a context which does specifically concern the plaintiff. At the same
time, reliance upon Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., supra, a case in which
the disclosure took place in a context primarily directed towards
public entertainment, suggests strongly that the court regarded the
article in question as something less than informational. In this view
of the case, the disclosure was held actionable both because it failed
to deal specifically with the plaintiff's accident and because an evalua-
tion of the article itself disclosed it to be primarily in the nature of
entertainment. This would indicate an approach very similar to that
urged by Feinberg, supra, and Nizer, supra.
Irrespective of the view taken of the reasoning of the instant
decision, the correctness of the result can not be seriously questioned.
In many of these cases the courts have been too quick to apply the
public interest concept when a more intensive analysis would have
demonstrated the disclosure to be wholly unjustified. The result has
been a tendency on the part of some publishers to invade ruthlessly the
private lives of others on the basis of a public interest which is often
lacking in substance. To the extent that the principal case serves to
restrain the more flagrant violations by reminding contemporary
publishers that the public interest qualification is not unlimited, it
represents a helpful contribution to the law of privacy.
Anthony R. DeSanto
UNFAIR COMPETITION - SECONDARY MEANING OF TRADE NAMES -
INJUNCTIvE RELIEF
Defendants J. C. and Peter Tarantino transferred their interests
in a proposed restaurant, including the use of the name "Tarantino's",
to plaintiff corporation. Later, the defendants, who were engaged in
packing and distributing fish and allied products under the name
"Tara Bell", marketed a cocktail sauce labeled "Tarantino's". The
script was identical to that used by the restaurant, but at the bottom
of the label appeared defendant company's name. Plaintiff brought
this suit against J. C. Tarantino and others, individually and doing
business as Bell Smoked Fish Company, for an injunction from using
the name "Tarantino's" on labels of a cocktail sauce and for damages.
The lower court granted the injunction. On appeal, Held, affirmed.
Defendants could not use the name "Tarantino's" in connection with
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the marketing of a cocktail sauce for seafood. MacSweeney Enterprises,
Inc. v. Tarantino, -Cal. App.-, 235 P. 2d 266 (1951).
It has long been established that every person has a right to use
his own name in his trade or business. Turton v. Turton, 42 Cha. Div.
128, 58 L. J. Ch. 677 (1889); Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G. 896,
22 L. J. Ch. 675, 43 Eng Reprints, Full Report 351 (1853). See Nms,
1 UNFMR COMPETION AD TADE MmAus 198 (1947). What was
originally an absolute right in one's name, irrespective of the manner
of use, was, however, subsequently modified to the extent that one
would be protected in the use of his own name only against another,
who also using his own name, indulged in artifice. Meneely v. Meneely,
62 N. Y. 427 (1875).
Somewhat later the doctrine of secondary meaning has come into
use and it operates concurrently with the right to use one's own name.
If a name has become associated in the public mind with a particular
manufacturer or source, and a second comer uses the same name in
such a manner that there is a likelihood of deceiving the public into
buying his goods in the belief that they are really those of the first
user of the name, the courts will protect the first user whose name has
acquired the "secondary meaning". Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn &
Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2nd Cir. 1917); Merriam v. Saalfield, 198
Fed. 369 (6th Cir. 1912); 38 WoRDs AND PHRAs-s 428. Formerly, when
a trade name had acquired a secondary meaning, the user would only
be protected against a later user who was a competitor. Borden Ice
Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (7th Cir.
1912). It has now become the practice to provide protection against
those who are not in competing businesses, if the buyer associates
the product with the company whose name has acquired the secondary
meaning. Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264
N. Y. S. 459 (1932), aff'd without opinion, 262 N. Y. 482, 182 N. E.
30 (1933).
The extent of the injunctive relief granted to one whose name
has taken on a secondary meaning has varied. The courts will order
the defendant to place a statement on his product, advertising and
stationery to the effect that the article is not made by the person whose
name has acquired the secondary meaning. Waterman Co. v. Modern
Pen Co., 235 U. S. 88 (1914); National Distillers Products Corp. v. K.
Taylor Distilling Co., 31 F. Supp. 611 (E. D. Ky. 1940). See Wigmore,
Justice, Commercial Morality, and the Federal Supreme Court; The
Waterman Pen Case, 10 ILL. L. RIv. 178 (1915). A defendant may be
required to subordinate the use of his name on the article so that it
does not maintain a prominent position, but rather is overshadowed
by the design or other wording. Tanqueray Gordon & Co. v. Gordon,
10 F. Supp. 852 (N. J. 1935), appeal dismissed, 77 F. 2d 998 (1935);
R. B. Davis Co. v. Davis, 11 F. Supp. 269 (E. D. N. Y. 1935). Another
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approach has been to prohibit the use of the questioned name entirely.
Westphal v. Westphal, 216 App. Div. 53, 215 N. Y. S. 2d 4 (1926),
affd, 243 N. Y. 639, 154 N. E. 638 (1926). See 39 MICH. L. REv. 1046;
59 HARv. L. REv. 140.
Whatever the scope of the injunctive relief given, it must be kept
in mind that its purpose is to prevent unfair competition. Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413 (1915); United Drug Co.
V. Rectanus, 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1913). One has the right to the use of his
own name provided he uses it properly. When a person's name has
acquired a secondary meaning, that person should be protected, but
only to the extent that it prevents unfair competition. The injunctive
relief should be no broader than necessary to protect the person whose
name has become known to the public. Wisconsin Electric Co. v.
Dumore Co., 35 F. 2d 555 (6th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 813
(1931); Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co, 235 Fed.
657, 663, 667-8 (6th Cir. 1916). See 150 A. L. R. 1056, 1129 (1940).
The injunction in the principal case enjoins the defendants ab-
solutely from using the name "Tarantino's" on a cocktail sauce for
seafood. The injunction could be narrower and still protect the
plaintiff. For example, defendants could be enjoined from simulating
plaintiff's script and be compelled to place the disputed name in a
subordinate position on their product's label and on their advertising.
Inasmuch as it is the purpose of courts to protect against unfair com-
petition, nothing can be gained by denying defendants the use of the
name "Tarantino's" when it does not mislead the consumer into
believing that he is purchasing an article prepared by the plaintiff.
Samuel H. Porter
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